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ABSTRACT: This paper deals with the recent episodes of stigmatization of solidarity in the context of the 
European migrant “crisis”. Securitarian measures frame as illegal not only migrants but also volunteers 
supporting them. Starting from the debate about “zero tolerance” policies, considered as a form of 
depoliticization of traditional politics, the research shows how NGOs and volunteers are becoming 
distrusted and conflictual, even if they long framed themselves as neutral and apolitical. An analysis of the 
recent emergency decrees and the decrease of trust in the Third sector, along with volunteers’ 
criminalization, reveals a changed picture for Third sector organizations. The Ventimiglia case study is 
representative of this changed context. The 11
th
 June 2015 the French-Italian border has been closed; 
since then, civil society has been involved in supportive and conflictual actions about the migrants’ 
presence, while local politics tried to avoid political confrontation. In this situation, depoliticized politics 
has indirectly extended the target of its norms, stigmatizing not only migrants but also their supporters. 
We now deal with NGOs and volunteers conflictual and distrusted. Changes in the Third sector are helpful 
to consider the fragmentation and the politicization of solidarity. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Over recent years cases of stigmatization have involved volunteers and the Third 
sector organizations (TSOs), despite they used to be characterized by a positive 
prejudice. These episodes are related to issues discussed by public opinion, such as 
migration and security, and draw a new framework for certain TSOs, that now see 
themselves more conflictual than they used to be. 
The European migrant “crisis” has had several consequences on NGOs and 
volunteers. In Europe several securitarian norms and measures are labelling 
solidarity behaviors and actions as deviant, especially when they benefit migrants. 
Several episodes of stigmatization of volunteers, who were prosecuted for their 
actions in favor of migrants, were reported at the European borders (Fekete, 
Webber, Edmond-Pettitt 2017; Lunaria 2017; Maccanico, Hayes, Kenny, Barat 2018; 
Amnesty International 2017, 2019; Médecins sans frontièrs 2018a, 2018b). The 
southern borders of Europe, especially, witnessed activists being prosecuted by 
tribunals and the labelling of volunteers by police officers. Even such actions as the 
distribution of food and beverage to migrants have been banned, for the sake of 
order and public hygiene. 
The “birth of the humanitarian border” (Walters 2011) in Europe shows “the 
emergence of a transnational discourse of compassionate border security that fuses 
humanitarian and militarised logics” (Little, Vaughan-Williams 2017, 535). The 
securitarian management of migration has the indirect consequence of a negative 
labelling of actors who used to be considered just as neutral ambassadors of 
international law, with a low impact on local politics. This stigmatization of NGOs 
emerged in a moment of increasing distrust towards the Third sector in the western 
world. Several authors, moreover, have begun questioning the role of NGOs, 
pointing out the darker sides of international cooperation (Marcon 2002; Polman 
2009; Marelli 2011), the ambiguity of humanitarian government and the politics of 
compassion (Fassin 2012) and the instrumentalization of solidarity in communication 
(Chouliaraki 2013).  
The Sea and Rescue operations (SAR) in favor of migrants in the Mediterranean 
Sea have been the object of a great debate in Europe (Milazzo 2018; Georgiou, 
Zabarowski 2016); this increased the conflict and connection between migration and 
NGOs. In 2013, the Mare Nostrum operation showed how the “humanitarian aspect 
in favour of migrants co-exists with the military logic of protection (of Europeans) 
against migrants” (Musarò 2017, 12) and thus make the Mediterranean a 
depoliticized border with a technocratic management of migration (ibid., 24).  
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Then, the European decision to close the Mare Nostrum operation, considered too 
expensive, had an even greater impact on Southern countries and Italy in particular. 
The new SAR operation, called Triton, launched in 2014, based only on the voluntary 
contribution of European countries, could not be efficient as Mare Nostrum; therefore 
several NGOs and volunteers decided to give their spontaneous help. All Italian media 
dealt with this “crisis” and suspicions were aroused on the true motives of these 
humanitarian operations. In 2017 the Italian government proposed a code of conduct 
to regulate NGOs SAR operations; in summer 2018 the relation with NGOs plunged 
downwards with the closing of ports to the NGOs willing to dock in Italy with migrants 
on board. Also, the judiciary system is playing an important role in this issue, with 
NGOs being tried for their alleged relations with traffickers.  
This suspicion is not one-sided, because it is the entire language around volunteering 
that has changed. The well-known Italian journalist Massimo Gramellini in an article 
entitled “Little Red Riding Hood” (2018), defined the reason to volunteer of a 
kidnapped young girl as an “urge for self-sacrifice”. 
While stigmatizing strangers is not a new phenomenon, a stigma against 
volunteering and NGOs has only recently become widespread. The escalation of the 
stigmatization of migrants in recent years has been successfully described by Dal Lago 
(1999, 2000). This phenomenon has grown and developed consequently to the 
diffusion of “zero tolerance” policies (Wacquant 2009). Since Goffman’s definition of 
stigma (2003), different definitions have been elaborated. This fact has been an object 
of criticism, because its definition varies considering the discipline and the subject of 
research (Link, Phelan 2001). For the scope of this research the starting point is the 
stigmatization of migrants considered as “not-person” (Dal Lago 1999), necessarily 
treated differently from citizens. The stigmatization of NGOs and volunteers operates 
through a legislative targeting that extend the stigma to those who are supportive 
towards these “not-people”. Solidarity towards migrants thus becomes an illegal 
solidarity, while legal solidarity is the one addressed to proper citizens. This shows how 
“law has become a dominant technique in liberal ways of governing” (Basara 2015, 
207). 
This conflict in relation to NGOs and volunteers is the starting point for the research 
question of this paper. The objective of the research is to frame the stigmatization and 
distrust of volunteers and NGOs in the migration field as part of a larger phenomenon 
that crosses the Third sector and the concept (and practice) of solidarity.  
The objective is not to study stigmatization per se, but rather to understand how 
solidarity is shaped within this changed context. This work is aimed at finding an 
answer to following questions: what role do depoliticized and securitarian policies play 
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in the growing conflict and distrust around NGOs and volunteers? How and why is 
the Third sector stigmatized and distrusted? How are these phenomena 
representative of a change in social solidarity? 
In order to do so I will first consider the connection between a new development of 
securitarian politics and the renewed interest in the concept and practices of solidarity. 
The third and fourth section show methodology and results of the analysis of the 
general context and the case study of Ventimiglia; it is a border city between Italy and 
France, a humanitarian border, where emergency discourse enables both “zero 
tolerance” measures and various solidarity practices. In the conclusion section I will 
argue that depoliticized politics has indirectly extended the target of its norms, 
stigmatizing not only migrants but also their supporters. NGOs and volunteers are now 
conflictual and distrusted. Through the lenses of a changed Third sector, that is 
changing its solidarity drive towards a more hybridized nature, we may consider social 
fragmentation and the politicization of solidarity within a context that fosters 
securitarianism and national solidarity. 
 
 
2. Solidarity and depoliticization 
 
The theoretical framework of this paper considers the connection between a new 
development of securization and the renewed interest in the concept and practices 
of solidarity. The aim of this review is to consider the possible implication that can 
be assumed about how the stigmatization of volunteers and TS organizations might 
re-shape solidarity. 
I want to argue that the reshaping of the concept and practices of solidarity is fed 
by changes that involve the Third sector and by the expansion of the target of 
securitarian politics from outcasts to social movements and NGOs.  
I consider the Third sector as a unique subject because of its one defining 
characteristic: the solidarity aim (Donati, 1996), even though its lines are blurred and 
authors such as Moro (2014) even questioned the utility of defining the sector in 
itself. The solidarity drive makes the Third sector useful to make considerations on 
the transformation of social bonds and the shaping of social solidarity in 
contemporary western societies. This sector is also changing fast, challenging 
previous literature perspectives. Some considered it as a new opportunity different 
than state and market to address social problems after the economic crisis; others 
looked at it as a new political means of participation, to overcome the crisis of 
representative politics. In a way, solutions to political, economic and social problems 
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were sought out and found in social movements and TSOs. The roles of these two 
actors are rooted in the dichotomic nature of solidarity between integration and 
conflict, that Chouliaraki (2013, 10) defines as “solidarity as salvation” and “solidarity 
as revolution”. Solidarity, indeed, is considered not just in its integrative role but also in 
its conflictual one. Solidarity has always had a double nature; one apolitical and neutral 
and another political and conflictual.  
This dichotomy has recently been challenged by different processes that show a 
transformation of the Third sector. The political and conflictual role of social 
movements now seems more relaxed, oriented towards the development of resilience 
strategies against the crisis (Mattoni, Vogiatzoglou 2014; Guidi, Andretta 2015; Kousis 
2017); within a context where grass-root innovative and resilient strategies show an 
ambiguous nature with high risks of fragmentation (Alteri, Cirulli, Raffini 2019). 
Moreover, there is a progressive decrease of conflicted relations in the Third sector 
(Busso, Gargiulo 2017). This is also because of changes towards the hybridization of the 
Third sector, that is now marketized (Eikenberry, Kluver 2004), professional and 
bureaucratized (Salvini 2012). Both this relaxation of the Third sector’s political nature 
and its hybridization find support in the recent Italian Third Sector reform that, on 
different levels, opens the sector to the market and bureaucratize its activities.  
On another perspective, considering NGOs, a general trend towards controlling civil 
society organizations is developing. While scholars started from studying low-middle 
income countries (Dupuy, Ron, Prakash 2016), the phenomenon is spreading in 
western society too, making religious organization and NGOs more conflictual. Their 
promotion of universal solidarity is leading them to be targeted as enemies of national 
solidarity. Politics is expressing practices of labelling of their volunteers and activists. 
Despite this, their members still do not identify in a political cause, but rather, they 
relate more closely with a humanitarian and non-controversial one. The expansion of 
the stigmatization of activists is particularly relevant because it now includes subjects 
that perceive themselves as being neutral and non-political.  
We can see an extension of stigmatization from outcasts to social movements and 
now to NGOs and volunteers. In fact, a recent study of the criminalization of the 
protest of social movements and their activists (Chiaramonte, Senaldi 2018) shows how 
criminalization is more and more used by politics to (un)politically deal with conflictual 
actors. However, while social movements are generally critical of neoliberal politics, 
NGOs and non-conflictual TSOs are less hostile to it; they are often shaped and act 
within the very depoliticized environment created by neoliberal politics. Their solidarity 
claim calls upon an apolitical humanitarianism, as they do not seek conflict or political 
confrontation. Of course, also humanitarianism has undergone a profound reshaping, 
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assuming great relevance in a public debate governed by a morality from emotions 
on the one side (Fassin 2012) and becoming more and more intertwined with 
military and securitarian logic on the other (Musarò 2017). These changes seem to 
have left solidarity deprived of “grand narratives” (Chouliaraki 2013, 9), but open up 
to considerations about its politicization.  
Politics deal with migration as a criminal or humanitarian issue, putting aside 
political confrontation. While criminal laws traditionally targeted outcasts, now this 
strategy involves social movements and TSOs. Depoliticization is not a new 
phenomenon, “as a governing strategy is the process of placing at one remove the 
political character of decision making” (Burnham 2001, 128); I consider thus the 
“zero tolerance” politics one of its expressions. 
Securitarian politics imply the creation by law of two opposite groups. These two 
groups are at opposite sides of a juridical border, that creates concrete empirical 
effects. Indeed, it creates a division between the beneficiaries of a norm and its 
targets. 
 
“Zero tolerance” thus presents two diametrically opposite faces, depending on 
whether one is the (black) target or the (white) beneficiary, that is, depending on 
which side one finds oneself of the caste barrier that the rise of the American penal 
state has the effect—if not the function—of shoring up. (ibid., 26) 
 
Nowadays, the evolution of “zero tolerance” policies from the ‘90s sees not only 
the stigmatization of outcasts, but also that of their supporters and it shows an 
expansion of the target of the depoliticized norms. Following the logic of 
humanitarian securitarianism, solidarity towards migrants is considered to put 
national cohesion at risk; so, in the name of national solidarity and security these 
norms hit also those “beneficiaries” who are supportive of the targets and therefore 
lose their privilege.  
This kind of stigmatizing politics has not canceled the conflict; indeed, it has 
aroused instead, even in political subject that were more “neutral” just a few years 
ago. In fact, “eliminating the political nature of actions does not mean reducing the 
need for regulation but producing it in new ways” (de Nardis 2017, 347).  
This article will deal with the case of the border city of Ventimiglia. Indeed, cities 
are the place where “zero tolerance” policies are generally enforced. What happens 
when this kind of depoliticizations meets the necessity to deal with the migration 
crisis? The usual strategy in depoliticized cities is to call for more “decorum” and 
“public hygiene” and punish everyone who is deemed not to comply with these 
standards (Pisanello 2017).  
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Using this new decorum aesthetic, the metropolis can be administered without 
dealing with economic-political issues that tear apart the social tissue (Pisanello 2017, 
15. My translation) 
 
Security and immigration are often declined in terms of issues for tourism and 
commerce. In fact, the replacing of politics with economics ends up in many decisions 
which deal with incentives and prizes for good entrepreneurial initiative, rather than 
actual political decisions. Results of this depoliticization are well-studied phenomena 
such as the entrepreneurial management of cities (Harvey 1989) and the gentrification 
of city centers. The transformation of cities thus corresponds to a regeneration of the 
center and an expansion of outskirts, where marginalities are rejected.  
Which are the possible implications of the expansion of this politics to NGOs and 
volunteers? First, depoliticization may moves conflict from traditional politics to civil 
society level; targeting not just outcast but also their supporters may be part of a 
process of politicization of Third sector actors who used to be considered apolitical. 
This should help to consider how solidarity may play a fragmentation role. Growing 
distrust and spread of partial solidarities are signals of fragmentation and reshaping of 
solidarity; in this context the Third sector may either be a driver of re-politicization or 
fall again in an apolitical, or even marketized, humanitarianism. 
 
 
3. Research design 
 
The research is designed in order to represent the European and Italian context and 
then introduce the case study of Ventimiglia. 
For the general context, several documents have been used: laws, organization 
reports and surveys on Italian public opinion on the Third sector. After a brief analysis 
of the recent security decrees, I will summarize several NGOs reports about the 
stigmatization of volunteers involved in helping migrants, polls about citizens’ trust in 
NGOs and TSOs, with a final confrontation with the analysis of the Carta di Roma report 
(2018) about the migration “crisis” in the press. 
In order to analyze this general trend, I chose to adopt the case study analysis (Yin 
1994). Case studies are considered a suitable research strategy when dealing with a 
contemporary phenomenon with little control of the events by the observer (ibid., 8). A 
case study helps to answer questions about the processes of a phenomenon, how and 
why it happened. In this case, the chosen study is useful to answer questions about 
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how solidarity is shaping and which are the possible reasons for this: how did politics 
managed migration “crisis” in a border city? how are NGOs and volunteers 
in this context? How does this affect the practices and representation of solidarity? 
 So, this case study should help to observe the complexity of a macro-
phenomenon within a representative context. Ventimiglia is a humanitarian border 
since it is representative of a “transnational discourse of compassionate border 
security that fuses humanitarian and militarized logics” (Little, Vaughan-Williams 
2017, 535), where a permanent “crisis” enable “zero tolerance” measures along with 
grassroot practices of solidarity. It is a privileged place to represent the tension 
around solidarity and migrant issues among EU countries. Here humanitarian 
securization is a structure of a mediatized border that “work to simultaneously 
protect “us” from, and care for, mobile population” (Chouliaraki, Musarò 2017). 
Here, the frequent episodes of “criminalization of solidarity” (Maccanico et al. 2018) 
allow to understand how stigmatization of NGOs activities took shape. 
The period chosen for the analysis is between June 2015 and February 2019. On 
11th June 2015 the border with France closed and Ventimiglia faced the consequence 
of this event. Summer 2015 is significant not only for Ventimiglia, but for the whole 
of Europe: the Syrian refugees crisis had its effects in Europe too, Hungary started 
building its barrier at the border with Serbia, Europe launched the “hotspot 
approach” in its agenda on migration and there was the first big public opinion shock 
after the spreading of the photo of Alan Kurdi, a three-year-old Syrian boy who 
drowned on 2nd September 2015 in the Mediterranean Sea. 
In case study analysis it is possible to consider all actors engaged in the process to 
observe. Local politics is an example of depoliticized administration, that we can 
refer to the French and Italian governments and the EU.  As regards civil society 
level, in Ventimiglia there are strong networks of Italian and French associations, 
which originate from different “solidarity backgrounds” – harmonic and conflictual, 
both supportive of migrants; it also has a lively presence of neighborhood 
committees protesting against the permanence of migrants, groups that are also 
critical of administration and NGOs and express a need for national cohesion.  
In a case study it is possible to evaluate a variety of evidences, fact that was 
crucial to develop the diachronic analysis of the events which took place in 
Ventimiglia. I dealt with public reports of different TSOs present in the frontier 
region, local newspapers (Nice Matin; Primocanale; Riviera 24; Sanremo News) with 
regular updates about the situation in the frontier (and seldom national newspaper 
articles interested in Ventimiglia events). Other reference points were ordinances 
and public declarations of the mayor regarding migrants and NGOs. Finally, I refer 
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also to my contacts and my personal visits to the frontier in November 2017 and June 
2018, in occasion of observations activities of NGOs at the border (Anafé 2019). 
 
 
4. Findings 
 
4.1 General context: emergency decrees, distrust in NGOs and volunteers 
 
Emergency legislation is not recent in Italy, especially as concerns migrants. Its roots 
may be found in the beginning of the “zero tolerance” policies. Several securitarian 
measures against migrants have been implemented since the end of the 1990s: in 1998 
legislative decree nr 286, amended by law nr 189/2002, so called “Bossi-Fini”, and in 
2009 the emergency decrees of the Berlusconi government with law nr 94, so called 
“security package”. I will focus on the latest decrees on migration, following the 
migration “crisis” after June 2015, issued by Ministers of the Interior Minniti and 
Salvini, representing left and right parties in the Italian parliament respectively. 
The choice to use emergency decrees is per se symptom of a depoliticized measure, 
as it overrules the parliament’s democratic decision and deal with structural problems 
as contingencies. It represents the legislative power exercised out of urgency and not 
deliberation – therefore the reason why it does not depend on political orientation.  
Minniti issued two decrees in 2017, on urban security and immigration. Decree Law 
nr 13/2017, implemented by law nr 46/2017, develops “urgent measures” regarding 
international protection and “illegal immigration”. It provides reform of administrative 
and judicial proceedings on international protection; one of the most criticized 
measures was the abolition of second degree of judgement for international protection 
requests. The second emergency decree is nr 14/2017 Urgent measures on city 
security. Here urban security is defined as a “public good linked to livability and 
decorum in the city”. The definition of urban security as a public good provides local 
administrators with strong legal instruments for the management of security in cities. 
One such instrument was introduced with the so called “DASPO urbano”. Originally 
“D.A.SPO.” are bans against taking part in sport events (Divieto di Accedere alle 
manifestazioni SPOrtive), i.e. restrictive measures provided for people that are 
considered as a menace in public sport events owing to particularly violent behaviors. 
This measure was implemented within the urban context, with the new “urban 
DASPO”, to punish - by means of sanctions and expulsion measures - those holding 
conducts that may obstacle the access and the benefit from various public places such 
as stations, public transport means and several public spaces. On the grounds of this 
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new provision, several cities have defined their historical center as a place in which 
to implement the urban DASPO, hitting the outcast of the cities by sanctioning their 
presence in city centers as a menace to order and decorum. 
The new Minister of the Interior Salvini followed the path designed by his 
predecessor and as the first formal act of his office issued a new emergency decree. 
Security Decree nr 113/2018, implemented by law nr 132 on 1st December 2018, 
interestingly considers three different subjects together: immigration, public 
security, and the prevention and fight against criminal organizations1. Both ministers 
seem to work following public perception on migration, reinforcing the connection 
between the perception of security risks and the management of migration. An 
analysis of minister Minniti’s speechs shows this connection between the rhetoric of 
order about migration and the will to follow public perception, even against data 
evidences (Gargiulo 2018)2. Salvini Security Decree introduced stricter rules on 
immigration; more crimes committed by immigrants now lead to immediate 
expulsion and deletion of suspension of asylum request; there are limitation to free 
legal aid for migrants requesting humanitarian protection; longer detention time in 
expulsion centers; more funds available for expulsion procedures. SPRAR 
experiences, that provided for a territorial distribution of migrants in local 
communities wishing to host, have been restricted in favor of centralized detention 
structures. As to public security several norms deal with squatting and evictions. The 
police have been given new instruments to maintain public order: the decree 
launched the experimentation of taser and expanded the resort to “DASPO”, 
following previous Minniti’s provisions. 
While politicians chose emergency decrees to deal with structural problems, 
moving the subject into a depoliticized arena, civil society organizations showed 
increasing opposition to this trend, mobilizing to promote solidarity towards 
migrants. The securitarian trend, however, does not only concern migrants and 
outcast. In the last 10 years several organizations denounced the government’s 
tendency to issue punitive laws towards them. 
 
1
 The 15
th
 June 2019 another security decree, nr 53/2019, has been issued. It deals again with migration 
issues and public security and will be probably converted into law within 60 days from its entry into force.  
2
About this issue the former Italian Minister of the Interior Minniti declared that “security is a perception” 
and not statistic. See Repubblica.it, Revised July 14, 2019. 
(https://www.repubblica.it/politica/2017/05/10/news/minniti_e_la_sfida_della_sicurezza_difendo_chi_ha
_paura_ma_a_sparare_sia_solo_lo_stato_e_sui_migranti_via_alle_ispezioni_-165063118/). 
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Amnesty International wrote a couple of reports about this attitude change: Human 
rights defenders under threat – a shrinking space for civil society (2017) and Laws 
designed to silence: the global crackdown on civil society organisations (2019). 
 
Over the last two years, almost 40 pieces of legislation have been either put in place 
or are in the pipeline restricting the activities, resources and autonomy of civil society 
organizations in all regions of the world […]. This shows an alarming global trend that has 
surfaced over the last decade in which those in power have acquired sweeping powers to 
control, ban and criminalize certain activities in a discriminatory manner and without 
legitimate reasons, as well as to target those who oppose government policies or who 
defend marginalized groups. (2019, 37) 
 
In 2018, Hungary approved the “Stop Soros” package, a reform that includes 9 
different laws, including police and criminal dispositions and a law on asylum and 
border control, defining the crime of “facilitating illegal immigration”. Russia and 
several East European countries such as Belarus, Polonia, Romania and Ukraine have 
implemented more and more law restrictions for NGOs funding and accountability. In 
2012 Russia issued a "foreign agent" law regarding nonprofit organizations; this law 
entails for organizations that receive foreign donations and engage in political activity – 
intended as generally influencing public opinion, to register as foreign agents. Of 
course, the labelling as foreign agents has a serious negative connotation.  
The UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, in its 
report Saving lives is not a crime (2018), focused on “the criminalization and targeting 
of humanitarian services and actors arising from activities to fight terrorism and deter 
migration and from the outlawing or stigmatization of sexual and reproductive rights”. 
As to western Europe, it is the migration “crisis”, starting from summer 2014, that 
changed the relations between TSOs and institutions into conflictual ones. Indeed, 
from that moment onwards the SAR operations were considered by Frontex (European 
Border and Coast Guard Agency) (2017) as a pull factor for the arrival of new migrants3. 
The end of Mare Nostrum in 2014, with the start of operation Triton in August, saw an 
intensification of the SAR operation by sea by several NGOs, filling the institutional 
void.  
From that time on, several NGOs reports denounced a stigmatization of human 
rights activists and the diffusion of the “crime of solidarity” (Fekete et al. 2017; Lunaria 
 
3
 The first article that reported the concern about NGOs as pull factor is in D. Robinson, “EU border force 
flags concerns over charities’ interaction with migrant smugglers”, Financial Times, 15 December 2016; 
then reported in Frontex reports. 
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2017; Maccanico et al 2018; Amnesty International 2017, 2019; Médecins sans 
frontières 2018a, 2018b). That happened not just in the Mediterranean Sea but in 
every place that can be defined as humanitarian border, where the representation 
migrants as victims and threats is mirrored by humanitarian actions and 
and securization at the border.   
While NGOs feel more targeted by governments, they are also less trusted by 
public opinion. People are showing a decrease in trust in institutions in late 
modernity (Giddens 1994) and this trend also involve the Third sector. In 2018 the 
Eldeman Trust Barometer showed trust declining in NGOs in 14 out of 28 markets. 
While there is an increase of trust in most markets in 2019, Italy is the country that 
has lost most trust in recent years, going from 59 points in 2017 to 46 in 2018, and 
44 in 2019. 
The trend does not just cover NGOs and big solidarity multinationals, for it may 
seem easier to observe a growing distrust in big and distant organizations. Data 
shows that trust towards the Third sector is declining in general. The latest data on 
volunteering from Eurispes institute (2018) show a general trend of decline in trust, 
even against the general trend of little increase in institutional trust. An Ipsos 
analysis confirms the general trend of distrust as regards the nonprofit institutions in 
Italy4. 
This strong distrust shows a more critical public opinion towards subjects that had 
long been perceived - and perceived themselves - as non-conflictual. 
Thus, the changed position of some TS organizations can be seen not only as a conflict 
with traditional institutions, but also a widening citizens’ distrust. This growing conflict 
seems to be going along with the tendency to increase news on migrations. As we can 
see in figure 1, starting from 2015 more and more NGOs are linked to migration crisis 
in Italy. 
The migration issue put at the center of public opinion those organizations that 
have long perceived themselves as non-conflictual. This new context requires TSOs 
to face their changed role, within a context that had already put them in a more 
critical perspective. This conflictual role is the result of the politicization of 
humanitarian issues, as opposed to securitarian depoliticized solutions of politics. 
Because of this fact TSOs, NGOs and volunteers have perceived themselves at risk in 
the last few years, in western countries too. Politics, that do not wish to deal 
 
4
Nando Pagnoncelli speech, La rappresentanza all’epoca dell’incertezza e della sfiducia, Malga Lunga, Sep-
tember 25, 2017. It reports a general crisis in institution, but non-profit institutions are the organizations 
with least trust, and it shows a constant decrease from February 2014 (71 points) till May 2017 (59 points). 
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politically nor with migration issue neither with civil society protests, condemn both 
migrants and their supporters through the device of illegality.  
 
Figure 1. Trend of news about migration in the first pages of five Italian newspapers (1 January 2015 - 31 October 
2018)5.  
 
Source: Milazzo G. (a cura di) (2018), Notizie di Chiusura. Sesto Rapporto Carta di Roma, Associazione Carta di Roma, 
https://www.cartadiroma.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Notizie-di-chiusura.pdf, p. 16 (original in Italian, my 
translation). 
 
4.2 The case of Ventimiglia 
 
Ventimiglia has been under the spotlight since 11th June 2015, a turning point at the 
French-Italian border. Since then the city has become a reference point for solidarity 
activism in favor of migrants and security measures from Italian and French politics. 
Even though the French-Italian frontier has been subjected since 2011 to some 
frontier controls from France, it is only starting from June 2015 that identity checks, 
residence and travel permit checks and controls on the movement of people have been 
implemented (ASGI 2015; Anafé 2019). At that date France closed its border as a 
 
5
Note (figure 1). We can see how in 2017 and 2018 trend of news about migration are linked to news about NGOs SAR 
operations. 
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security measure following the G7 meeting in Bavaria, as did Austria and Germany. 
This decision had serious consequences in Ventimiglia. Since then a group of 
migrants and no borders associations stopped at the border and started their 
protests, as was spread by all Italian media. From that moment onwards the city was 
forced to divest the role of passive spectator of migrations towards France. After 
that, the regular freedom of circulation was never re-introduced at this border; 
several French decisions have maintained the internal border controls through 
various legislative reforms. Initially thanks to five reiterated états d’urgence disposed 
by President Hollande following the Paris attacks in November 2015, then with the 
30th October 2017 antiterrorism law nr 1510 by President Macron, with a sort of 
normalization of the emergency conditions. Finally, with 10th September 2018 law nr 
778 on asylum seekers. In this context many migrants continue to die in their efforts 
to pass the border6.  
Ventimiglia is a small border city with 24000 inhabitants. The administration was 
guided from 2014 until May 2019 by a left majority guided by mayor Enrico Ioculano. 
Complex dynamics here involve different Italian and French actors, not only 
solidarity groups pro-migrants, but also neighborhood organizations, migrants, 
police and prefects, the mayor of Ventimiglia and other politicians.  
The first protests started with the closure of the border. A group of migrants and 
no border activists – of the Presidio Permanente No Borders Ventimiglia, took part in 
demonstrations that lasted all summer, from June to September. The local 
administration condemned their actions through several evictions motivated by 
health and hygienic risks. 
In spring 2016, the growth in arrivals increased the migrants’ presence; thus a 
provisionary solution for migrants’ reception was found in a transit center 
Ventimiglia station. This solution was not welcomed by citizens, who had hoped the 
center to be in a less central and visible area. 
Some migrants started to move near river Roja, not far from the city center, in 
informal settlements. At the time, in the district area called Gianchette, 
Sant’Antonio Church became the coordination center for a group of volunteers that 
have been self-managing spontaneous hosting of migrants since 2016. 
 
Don Rito Alvarez, a parish priest in Ventimiglia for 20 years, began to coordinate a 
group of up to 200 volunteers. “There were local Italians, but also people from France, 
the UK and the United States. The Red Cross from Monaco came, a group of Muslims 
 
6
Local newspapers, Primo canale (https://www.primocanale.it/) and Riviera24 (https://www.riviera24.it/) 
report periodically migrants’ deaths at the border.  
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from Nice, Vietnamese volunteers, boy scouts from Monte Carlo. It was an extraordinary 
experience: so many different people helping people in need. We served up to 1,000 
meals per day,” he says. (Oxfam 2018, 7) 
 
In this period, several negotiations, also involving the diocese of Imperia, were 
aimed at finding a formal solution to overcome the self-managed center, but none was 
was found. A popular petition started to gather signatures asking to move migrants out 
of Gianchette quarter7. So, in July 2016 the Italian Red Cross, in agreement with the 
Prefect of Imperia set up a transit camp 4km away from the city center. The deal was 
that in order to be hosted it was necessary to be identified; most people despite that 
did - and do - not wish to be identified since they do not want Italy to be their first 
country of arrival8. In addition to this, the distance from the city center makes the 
permanence in the center non-desirable for those who - the majority - see the stay in 
Ventimiglia as a temporary stop. Finally, the center has limited and promiscuous 
spaces, so that not everyone could, or would want to be hosted there. For all these 
reasons, many people remained in the informal settlement near river Roja. Only few 
women and children could still be hosted in Sant’Antonio Parish. Don Rito Alvarez was 
subjected to protests and threatening letters from Ventimiglia citizens because of this 
hospitality9.  
In August the mayor signed an ordinance10 that prohibited the distribution of food 
and beverage to migrants. The ordinance was motivated by hygiene and health 
reasons. It would be repealed only on 22nd April 2017. The motivation was argued as 
“the verification of a factual change that could not be predicted at the time of its 
adoption”11, but the repeal of the ordinance was probably a consequence of more 
political consideration. The arrest of three French citizens on 20th March 2017 due to 
the no-food ordinance, provoked a strong reaction from pro-migrants movements and 
associations. Also, national media got interested in the event and a big demonstration 
was to be held the Sunday following the repeal of the ordinance. 
 
7
https://www.riviera24.it/2016/07/ventimiglia-parte-petizione-popolare-per-spostare-i-migranti-dalle-
gianchette-229002/. 
8
Based on the “Dublin III regulation”, Reg. nr 604/2013. 
9
https://genova.repubblica.it/cronaca/2018/05/11/news/ventimiglia_ancora_minacce_di_morte_a_don_r
ito-196113050/. 
10
Ordinance nr 129/2016, PROT. 28235, issued 11/08/2016 entitled “Ban against distributing and 
administering food and bevarage in public areas on the part of non authorized people” (Divieto di 
distribuzione e/o somministrazione di alimenti e bevande nelle aree pubbliche da parte di persone non 
autorizzate). 
11
Ordinance nr 85/2017, PROT. 14839, issued 22/04/2017. 
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In 2017, more and more people and organizations got coordinated to offer legal 
and material assistance to the 23000 migrants who had successfully passed the 
border (Oxfam 2018). These groups were not the only ones activated by the 
migrants’ presence. Different neighborhood organizations multiplied (Le Gianchette, 
Borgo Marina San Giuseppe, Giardini Mare) along with related city committees such 
as “Dalla nostra parte” (On our side) and “Adesso Basta” (That’s enough now)12. 
The committee “On our side” in May 2017 asked for the reinstatement of the no-
food ordinance. 
 
Dear Major, reinstate the ordinance that forbids the administration of food and 
beverage to migrants in the street, to put an end to this indecent and shameful show, 
the good of the city and the strangers themselves.
13
 
 
The reason invoked was, again, the risk for “heavy health and hygienic risk for 
citizens”. The various committees insisted on making sure the only place eligible to 
host migrants would be Roja park, 4km away from the center. They did not want a 
new reception center in their neighborhoods. This request was accepted and the 
capacity of the Red Cross center in Roja park was partially increased, while no 
alternative was accomplished. The construction of a center for unaccompanied 
children was interrupted on 9th august 2017 due to the protest of several citizens 
(AIDA, 99); a committee of San Giuseppe neighborhood organized a petition against 
the building of this center, and many shops exhibited this petition for the public to 
sign. Another anti-migrant demonstration was held in November 2017 for the 
expulsion of every migrant, with heavy protests also against the mayor and the 
municipal council14. 
In August also the experience in Gianchette parish was ended by the prefect of 
Imperia, and the families left out were moved to the Red Cross center. AIDA (Asylum 
Information Database) reports that on 11th December 2017 the center hosted 24 
unaccompanied children together with 426 adults, 9 single women and 30 families. 
ASGI and other NGOs sent an official letter to the Prefecture of Imperia in December 
2017, urging “an end to these unlawful practices and the preparation of the 
 
12
http://www.sanremonews.it/2017/08/12/leggi-notizia/argomenti/cronaca/articolo/ventimiglia-in-300-
alla-manifestazione-contro-i-migranti-il-pubblico-invoca-le-dimissioni-del-sind.html. 
13
http://www.ilgiornale.it/news/cronache/migranti-rabbia-dei-cittadini-ventimiglia-rischio-sanitario-
1399754.html; https://www.riviera24.it/2017/05/migranti-a-ventimiglia-comitato-dalla-nostra-parte-
ripristinare-lordinanza-di-divieto-di-somministrazione-dei-cibi-e-bevande-254743/. 
14
https://www.nicematin.com/faits-de-societe/une-manifestation-anti-migrants-a-eu-lieu-ce-samedi-a-
vintimille-183002. 
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necessary measures for these children to be accommodated and placed in appropriate 
reception centers” (ibidem). 
The case of Delia’s “Hobbit” bar is representative of tension between a part of 
Ventimiglia citizenship and TSOs. This bar had become a place of reception for migrants 
migrants since June 2015 and with time it equipped to offer practical help to any 
person who asked for it. This kind of solidarity provoked strong reactions from those 
citizens who did not appreciate it. They began to avoid the bar and the bar owner 
received insults and menaces. This citizens’ hostility at the same time enhanced 
solidarity from associations and no borders groups, that on 13th September 2018 also 
also created a fund-raising campaign to support the bar on gofundme.com15. The fund 
raising reached almost 40.000 € in February 2019. 
Since November 2017 a French-Italian inter-associative group has started monitoring 
actions at the border to check police behavior and potential violation of asylum 
seekers’ rights16. The observations take place where the police and military presence is 
higher, i.e. in the train stations near the border (Ventimiglia and Menton-Garavan) and 
near Bridge San Ludovico where the police (PAF) carry out their border controls. In 
February 2018 this group of associations together with French and Italian lawyers 
started a judicial act at Nice tribunal against the refoulment of 20 unaccompanied 
minors. The judge recognized the unlawfulness of the practice for 19 case out of 20 
(one was recognized as an adult)17. The monitoring of the associations then enlarged its 
target of observation considering other border cities among those more affected by 
migrants’ passages: Briançon, Claviere and Bardonecchia, and mountain border cities in 
general. 
One activist of this observation group, Martine Landry, a volunteer for Amnesty 
International France and Anafé, is under proceedings. The accusation is that of favoring 
illegal immigration. The woman helped two minors, who had just passed the borders, 
by calling the French police to send them to the social services. She was absolved in 
first degree of judgement in July 2018, but the prosecutor has appealed the sentence. 
The case of Martine is not a unicum, other people have been prosecuted for their acts 
 
15
https://www.gofundme.com/solidarieta-per-delia. 
16
French associations: Anafé, ADDE (Avocats pour la défense des droits des étrangers), La Cimade, 
Médecins du Monde, Médecins sans frontières, Secours Catholique Caritas France, AdN (Association pour 
la Démocratie à Nice), Citoyens Solidaires 06, DTC-Défends ta citoyenneté, LDH Nice, Pastorale des 
migrants du diocèse de Nice, Roya Citoyenne, Syndicat des Avocats de France. Italian associations: 
Amnesty International Liguria, ASGI (Associazione Studi Giuridici sull’Immigrazione), Caritas, Intemelia 
OdV, Diaconia Valdese, Intersos, OXFAM Italie, Terre des Hommes Italie, WeWorld Onlus. 
17
https://www.asgi.it/allontamento-espulsione/frontiera-francia-italia-diritto-asilo-protezione-minori-
stranieri/. 
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of solidarity: for example Cedric Herrou, a French shepherd who hosts migrants at 
his home in Val Roja; Pierre Alain Mannoni, a researcher at the University of Nice, 
who helped a group of migrants pass the border; recently also the Alpine border saw 
this kind of judicial cases, with the case of the seven condemns in Briançon18. One 
important turning point for these French judiciary events was the absolution of 
Herrou by the French Constitutional Court in the name of the principle of fraternité 
July 201819. 
In April 2018 the informal settlement near the river was evicted20. As in the case 
eviction, and previous ordinances, the action was motivated by health and hygienic 
reasons. Starting from that moment, migrants’ groups are being dispersed in the 
territory and are certainly less visible now. After the eviction precarious conditions 
aggravated. Save the Children reports that female minors are forced to prostitute in 
order to pay the toll to pass the border, to eat or to sleep21. Médecins sans 
frontières (2018) reports migrants living in weak health and hygienic conditions – 
despite all measures taken for sanitary reasons. 
Of course, not only NGOs and religious organizations worked to help migrants but 
also no borders groups, left collectives, mutual help organizations. Other than 
Presidio Permanente No Border, one big organization at the Ventimiglia border is 
Project 20k. It was born in spring 2016 thanks to some youths from Bergamo who 
had been at the border in summer 2015. After that, they held some public meetings 
in Bergamo and Milano at different spaces and decided to actively engage in favor of 
migrants.  
From July 2016 they organized an operative camp for the stable presence of some 
solidarity activists in Ventimiglia. The role of the center was to give material support, 
information, observation and public communication through the infopoint Eufemia 
and the legal counter Aid for all22. The project was promoted by Project 20k in 
collaboration with Melting Pot Europe Project and the association Popoli in Arte. The 
center was meant as a free space where migrants could recharge their phones, 
 
18
http://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/cronaca/2018/12/13/no-border-condannati-per-corteo-
claviere_1e858887-962f-4963-a32a-7f43bbde8d05.html. 
19
Decision nr 2018-717/718 QPC, 6 July 2018, 
https://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/decision/2018/2018717_718QPC.htm. 
20
With major ordinance nr 54, 13 April 2018.  
On the eviction: https://www.avvenire.it/attualita/pagine/ventimiglia-sgombero.  
21
https://www.primocanale.it/notizie/ventimiglia-il-dramma-delle-bambine-migranti-prostitute-per-
pagare-i-passeur-200139.html 
22
http://www.sanremonews.it/2017/07/15/leggi-notizia/argomenti/altre-notizie/articolo/ventimiglia-
presentato-eufemia-info-and-legal-point-al-quartiere-delle-gianchette-off.html 
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access the internet and find multilingual information about services in the city and 
international protection in Italy and Europe. The center closed in December 2018 due 
due to non-renewal of the lease contract, a fact that the organizations think must be 
motivated by political reasons. Project 20k claims that more than 60 measures of 
restriction of movements have been issued against solidarity activists at the border and 
and report an increase in violent practices on the part of the French police since the 
issue of Salvini’s decree in November 2018.  
Associations have also organized various demonstrations against the local and 
European governance on migration. The latest major demonstration held in Ventimiglia 
is the event “Ventimiglia, città aperta” (Ventimiglia, an open city), organized by Project 
20k with other different organizations supportive of migrants on 14th July 2018. This 
event saw the presence of around 2500 people coming from the north and center of 
Italy and numerous organizations. The days before the manifestation mayor Ioculano 
and bishop Suetta had invited the organizers to move the demonstration to France, 
suggesting that they should consider that country as the one truly responsible for the 
emergency at the border. Mayor Ioculano and the President of the region, Giovanni 
Toti, besides expressed their contrariety to the manifestation considering the 
fundamental importance of the date for transalpine tourism. The mayor released this 
emblematic declaration: 
 
We oppose to this manifestation nor for its content or for its message – but for the 
inconveniences it will bring to our city. To us the 14
th
 of July is a very important date 
under touristic and commercial profile. The manifestation would cause inconveniences, 
tension and difficulties
23
.  
 
The mayor’s rhetoric on the need to protect commerce and touristic opportunities 
for the city, by guaranteeing public order and hygiene never refers to migrants or 
volunteers explicitly, neither in his public speaking, nor in his administrative measures. 
These decisions are thus conceived as deprived of political nature. The tourist 
promotion is reinforced by a project that wants to transform the city into a 
“technology and security jewel” by summer 2019. The project is in partnership with the 
Principality of Monaco, which provides 7 million € for the maintenance of the city24.  
 
23
Link at the video https://www.primocanale.it/notizie/corteo-no-borders-a-ventimiglia-il-14-luglio-
ioculano-chiederemo-che-non-sia-autorizzato--199425.html (my translation). 
24
https://www.riviera24.it/2018/01/ventimiglia-un-gioiello-di-tecnologia-e-sicurezza-ecco-il-video-
promozionale-del-porto-di-cala-del-forte-276674/. 
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Local politics thus recur to emergency discourses to justify “zero tolerance” 
measures formally meant for the promotion of tourism and commerce. This is 
reinforced by the militarization of the spaces and the responsibility of major 
decisions shifted at a national and European level. 
The mayor on one hand hinders solidarity groups and migrants with securitarian 
measures, but still does not take an official position against volunteers or migrants.  
Actually, several times the mayor showed support to volunteers and NGOs and was 
present at some events organized by them. This attitude finds its emblematic 
representation in occasion of the inauguration of the installation of Michelangelo 
Pistoletto’s work “Third Paradise”, at the presence of the mayor and army25. The 
installation is situated at the border near bridge Saint Ludovic and is meant to be a 
symbolic representation of solidarity intercultural dialogue to overcome tension at 
the border. This, and other Pistoletto’s installations in Ventimiglia, such as the 
temporary installation of the Venus of the Rags in Sant’Antonio Church, shows what 
Mazzara (2019, 5) calls the “aesthetic potential of the migratory experience”, that 
may be part of a “re-signifying process” that aims to subvert the logic of de-
humanization and securitization and create a counter-narrative (ibidem, 111). 
Ventimiglia shows that depoliticization does not delete conflict, that, instead can 
be seen at different level of civil society. I described how some citizens of 
Ventimiglia organized in committees to hinder the settlements of migrants in their 
neighborhoods, while other citizens and local and international associations started 
material and legal solidarity towards migrants, with different visions of solidarity.  
While some organizations, such as Progetto 20k and no borders movements are 
comfortable framing themselves in a conflictual role, NGOs and religious 
organization deplore conflict between Italy and France and appeal to the two 
government to exhibit solidarity rather than competition in refoulment procedures 
and human rights violation. These organizations avoid conflict in their statements 
and seek legitimacy in international and European legislation. They follow a 
solidarity tradition that purposely avoid conflict, but in this new context find 
themselves within a new framework. With the other organizations they faced 
different dynamics of stigmatization. Today, historically low-conflict actors such as 
NGOs volunteers or the Red Cross can no longer fit the humanitarian and apolitical 
nature in which they used to identify. In this context no distinction is made between 
volunteers and passeurs, humanitarian and criminal aid being put at the same level 
by politics. Seldom, and with difficulties, it is in the court rooms that differences 
 
25
https://www.lastampa.it/2017/04/13/societa/il-terzo-paradiso-abbatte-le-frontiere-
vNiVZ3NUCbhLyhrNWh3BTP/premium.html. 
Partecipazione e conflitto, 12(2) 2019: 460-486, DOI: 10.1285/i20356609v12i2p460 
  
480 
 
between solidarity (or fraternité) and crime are still recognized, but this seems more of 
a vestige of post-war constitutional reforms.  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The aim of this paper was to understand how concept and practices of solidarity are 
re-shaped in a context of stigmatization and distrust of the Third sector and volunteers.  
The first question was about the role of depoliticized and securitarian policies. 
Stigmatization is the consequence of “zero tolerance” measures that extend their 
target from migrants to their supporters.  
 
The spectacle of the border that accompanies illegality production on migrants (de 
Genova, 2013) extend to solidarity citizens. (Giliberti 2017, 175. My translation) 
 
Labelling someone as criminal is a technique of governments to avoid political 
decisions. But it is still a way to govern and it still has consequences in the context 
where it is enforced. So, the choice to criminalize NGOs and volunteers question their 
apolitical nature. Both politics and a part of public opinion consider practices of 
solidarity toward migrants controversial and not to be approved without questions: 
humanitarianism is losing its apolitical nature.  
But how has this stigmatization occurred? Following the second question put at in 
the beginning of this work, it is not just a matter of law targeting NGOs. The “migration 
crisis” unveiled another question concerning the Third sector: the growing distrust in 
solidarity actors. Public opinion is starting to wonder what is the real motivation for 
NGOs and volunteers to act, since the solidarity aim is no longer taken for granted. It is 
relevant here to point out that the 2002/90/CE European directive defining the 
facilitation of unauthorized entry, transit and residence, specifies that the crime can 
exist only if the action is done “for profit” reasons. Considered that, humanitarian 
operations should be guarantee beyond doubt. Of course, they are not. That is no 
surprise, if we consider that it is also happening because the no-profitness of NGOs and 
volunteering is questioned, and so it is their solidarity. This puts conflict around 
solidarity within a context of the Third sector transformation. It is also a signal of 
independence of the Third sector from state and market, that, despite general 
consideration of its lack of conflict (Busso, Gargiulo 2017), find a new space in the 
political arena. 
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Finally, how do these phenomena affect social solidarity? Solidarity is going 
beyond the dichotomy between integration and conflict. In other words: 
 
Even tough humanitarianism has long been suspended between apolitical 
benevolence, in the solidarity of salvation, and radical militantism, in the solidarity of 
revolution, I have argued that it is today becoming more politicized than ever. 
(Chouliaraki 2013, 24) 
 
 To start questioning the nature of solidarity and TSOs means on the one side distrust 
and stigmatization and on the other politicization of humanitarian issues. The 
consequence of the conflict in the Third sector generates a combination of political and 
disruptive effect on social solidarity. The re-introduction in the debate and in the 
political and public arena of the migration issue shows an overcoming of depoliticized 
politics by civil society organizations. This conflict, however, has disruptive 
consequences in the practice of solidarity, which is then both stigmatized and limited. 
Moreover, solidarity dynamics seems to be promoted at group level but still cannot 
find a solution in the Italian and European political arena. This dynamic accelerates the 
process of growing distrust toward TSOs; their role of solidarity actors is questioned 
along with the very concept of solidarity.  
 
Solidarity cannot, as a universal idea, define the borders of its action. […] but in this 
feeling of empathy and reciprocity, it is not in contrast with partial solidarities, 
declined as plurals, and built on the basis of generational or neighborhood affinities 
[…] solidarity today has the tendency to become a factor of exclusion (Blais 2012, 372-
373. My translation) 
 
The State, that in the last fifty years promoted the growth of the Third sector - 
also due to its retreat, if continues in the abdication from its political and regulative 
role may provoke a severe disruptive effect. 
The retreat of welfare state has questioned the path that had led from a solidarity 
between workers to national cohesion (Paci 2008). Welfare and migration “crises” 
have tested European and national solidarities. If first reactions have involved the 
stigmatization of migrants, now it seems that this phenomenon could be a starting 
point of stigmatization of solidarity, going over the migrant issue and covering 
different sectors of solidarity, as we may see from recent episodes of a stigma being 
put on volunteering per se; this may represent an element of social fragmentation 
and general distrust.  
Partecipazione e conflitto, 12(2) 2019: 460-486, DOI: 10.1285/i20356609v12i2p460 
  
482 
 
In the end, considering a “bad” narrative and the deconstructive practices of 
solidarity (Cobbe 2014) is necessary, because in these elements of fragmentation we 
can find seeds of a re-politicization of the Third sector and solidarity as well. 
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